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Comments
COMMUNICATIONS WITH A DELIBERATING JURY
BY COURT OFFICERS IN A PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL CASE
Within the past several years the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania has frequently been asked to determine the prejudicial ef-
fect of a communication made to a deliberating jury in a civil
case by a court officer.1 The result of these decisions has been the
development by the court of a rule dictating that whenever any
such communication has taken place a new trial must be granted
regardless of the actual prejudice arising therefrom.
This Comment will trace the development of the law of jury
communications in civil cases in Pennsylvania, analyze the recent
decisions to illuminate the current status of the law and offer
suggestions for the elimination of the inequities which result from
an unyielding application of this "prophylactic rule." This Com-
ment will discuss only those communications made after the jury has
received the trial judge's charge and has retired to determine the
verdict. The types of communication dealt with will cover the en-
tire spectrum from physical entrance into the jury room by a trial
judge to a secret note sent from the bench to the jury.2 Since the
1. Murphy v. Taylor, 440 Pa. 186, 269 A.2d 486 (1970); O'Donnell v.
Thayer, 434 Pa. 555, 252 A.2d 148 (1969); O'Donnell v. Bachleor, 429 Pa. 498,
240 A.2d 484 (1968); Dejohn v. Orell, 429 Pa. 359, 240 A.2d 472 (1968); Argo
v. Goodstein, 424 Pa. 612, 228 A.2d 195 (1967); Yarsunas v. Boros, 423 Pa.
364, 223 A.2d 696 (1966); Kersey Mfg. Co. v. Rozic, 422 Pa. 564, 222 A.2d 713
(1966); Argiro v. Phillips Oil Co., 422 Pa. 433, 220 A.2d 654 (1966); Glenden-
ning v. Sprowls, 405 Pa. 222, 174 A.2d 865 (1961).
For the purposes of this Comment, the term "court officer" shall include
the trial judge, the tipstaff, the bailiff and the court crier.
2. The majority of the decisions noted in this Comment deal with
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greatest number and most controversial cases have been civil, crim-
inal decisions will be examined only for the limited purpose
of comparing them to the decisions in civil cases.
I. BACKGROUND
The development of a new rule of questionable value has hall-
marked the recent decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
when asked to determine whether reversible error has been com-
mitted when a court officer has communicated with a jury in the
midst of deliberation.3 The seeds of the confusion resulting from
these decisions were planted in the early 1960's 4 when the court
completely altered the law of jury communications and, in so doing,
disregarded a long line of decisions dating back to 1847.5 How-
ever, it was a divided court that affected this changeover with the
minority violently protesting the majority's action.6 The fervor of
the split on the court can be attributed to two factors: (1) the un-
compromising unwillingness of the minority to accept the majority's
new position resulting in an irreconcilable split in the court mani-
fested by the filing of numerous strongly worded dissents7 and
(2) the inability of the majority to vocalize sufficiently strong ar-
guments to justify the sudden change in position.
8
To aid in analyzing the cases discussed in this Comment, it will
be helpful to view each one as falling into one of the following
three categories: Category 1: the communication was clearly in-
situations where the trial judge has communicated with the jury by an ex-
change of notes without first consulting with counsel concerning the sub-
stantive content of the note, or permitting counsel to object to the procedure
or substance of the note the judge intends to send to the jury.
3. The following four cases are primarily responsible for the institu-
tion of the "new rule": Argo v. Goodstein, 424 Pa. 612, 228 A.2d 195 (1967);
Yarsunas v. Boros, 423 Pa. 364, 223 A.2d 696 (1966); Kersey Mfg. Co. v. Rozic,
422 Pa. 564, 222 A.2d 713 (1966); Argiro v. Phillips Oil Co., 422 Pa. 433, 220
A.2d 654 (1966).
4. Glendenning v. Sprowls, 405 Pa. 222, 174 A.2d 865 (1961). As is
discussed, infra, it is dictum taken from this decision which legitimized the
later actions of the majority: see text accompanying notes 28-30 infra.
5. The first reported case dealing with jury communications in
Pennsylvania was Cunningham v. Patton, 6 Pa. 355 (1847).
6. Mr. Chief Justice Bell, Mr. Justice Roberts and Mr. Justice Mus-
manno filed a total of ten dissenting opinions in the four cases cited in note
3 supra.
7. E.g., Argo v. Goodstein, 424 Pa. 612, 618, 228 A.2d 195, 198 (1967)
(Musmanno's dissenting opinion); Argiro v. Phillips Oil Co., 422 Pa. 433,
437, 220 A.2d 654, 656 (1966) (Musmanno's dissenting opinion).
8. A typical opinion in support of the changeover is the majority
opinion of Mr. Justice Cohen in Argo v. Goodstein, 424 Pa. 612, 228 A.2d 195
(1967).
nocuous and nonprejudicial; Category 2: the communication pos-
sibly may have but in all likelihood did not create prejudice to one
of the parties; and Category 3: the communication was clearly
prejudicial or prejudice could reasonably be presumed from it. As
will be illustrated, only the cases falling into Category 3 have es-
caped controversy.
II. PRE-1961 RULE: AD Hoc APPROACH
Between 1847 and 1961, the courts of Pennsylvania demon-
strated a high degree of tolerance toward communications made be-
tween court officers and the jury out of the presence of both parties
and their counsel. 9 While the great majority of the cases in that
period dealt with the trial judge giving a written or verbal answer
to a note he had previously received from the jury requesting
further information, there were several instances where the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania even refused to grant a new trial after
the judge or other officer had actually conversed with the jury in
the jury room.10
The general rule representative of this group of pre-1961 cases
was aptly expressed in Sapsara v. People's Cab Co.1 In that case, a
trespass action, the jury wrote a note to the trial judge asking
whether they could find that the defendant-agent was not negligent
but still find the defendant-principal liable for plaintiff's medical
expenses. The written reply of the trial judge, given without noti-
fying the parties or their counsel, merely repeated the part of the
charge relating to liability. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
in refusing to grant plaintiff-appellant a new trial, stated:
It is undoubtedly the better practice for the court to
give additional instructions to [sic] jury only in the pres-
ence of the parties or their counsel, but the general rule is
that unless the court is convinced, not only that error was
committed, but also that such error did in all probability
harm the plaintiff, it is not reversible error. Consequently,
the mere fact that the judge has given additional instruc-
tions to the jury in the absence of the parties and their coun-
sel is not, per se, ground for granting a new trial .... 12
9. Illustrative cases are Sapsara v. People's Cab Co., 381 Pa. 241, 113
A.2d 278 (1955); Sebastianelli v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 337 Pa. 466,
12 A.2d 113 (1940); Allegro v. Rural Valley Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 268 Pa. 33, 112
A. 140 (1920); Earon v. Mackey, 106 Pa. 452 (1884); Krywucki v. Trommer,
199 Pa. Super. 145, 184 A.2d 389 (1962); Knight v. Showers, 87 Pa. D. & C.
105 (C.P. Elk 1953); Werezinski v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 32 Luz.
Leg. Reg. 283 (Pa. C.P. 1937).
10. Nyce v. Muffley, 384 Pa. 107, 119 A.2d 530 (1956) (two tipstaves
assisting in filling out verdict slips); Hunsicker v. Waidelich, 302 Pa. 224,
153 A. 335 (1931) (trial judge). Cf. Glendenning v. Sprowls, 405 Pa. 222,
174 A.2d 865 (1961) (trial judge); Welshire v. Bruaw, 331 Pa. 392, 200 A.
67 (1938) (tipstaff).
11. 381 Pa. 241, 113 A.2d 278 (1955).




In other words, the court acknowledged the general rule that it
is improper for a trial judge to communicate with the jury without
having first consulted with counsel, but then chose the practical ap-
proach of looking to the facts of the individual case to determine
whether or not the appellant was in fact prejudiced."1
Another case illustrative of the "old rule,"'14 is Hunsicker v.
Waidelich." Again the court expressed its unwillingness to apply a
general rule automatically before first determining that its appli-
cation would be justified under the particular facts of the case.
Therein, the trial judge, without being accompanied by either par-
ties or counsel, entered the jury room in order to ask the jurors
"how things were getting along." Upon being told "all right," he
replied "all right, I will wait." The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
in refusing to grant a new trial for this "improper but harmless
error," stated:
We cannot, however, express too forcibly our disapproval
of his action in invading the secrecy of the jury room. In-
structions to the jury must be given in open court in the
presence of the parties or their counsel. There may be no
private communications of any kind or character between
the judge and the jury, and if additional instructions are
needed they must be given in open court. The trial judge
should not, under any circumstances, enter the jury room,
however innocent and proper the purpose may be: Som-
mer v. Huber, 183 Pa. 162, 164-5. There is no way of de-
termining the influence which such act might have on the
minds of the jury, and the only safe course is to avoid all
questions by strictly adhering to the long established prac-
tice which requires that all deliberations by the jury to
be conducted in the utmost privacy.' 6
This case, along with Sapsara, discussed above, illustrates that
prior to 1961 the court was reluctant to reverse in cases where there
was clearly no prejudice or only a possibility of prejudice resulting
from the improper communication.
Conversely, when a case arose where a party clearly was prej-
udiced or prejudice could be reasonably presumed, there was no
hesitancy in granting a new trial. In Welshire v. Bruaw,'7 a drunk-
13. Id.
14. This Comment will use the following terms interchangeably: "old
rule," "ad hoc rule" and "minority rule." These terms will represent both
the rule utilized in Pennsylvania prior to 1961 and the position supported
by a minority of the members of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court at the
present time.
15. 302 Pa. 224, 153 A. 335 (1931).
16. Id. at 232, 153 A. at 337.
17. 331 Pa. 392, 200 A. 67 (1938).
en tipstaff repeatedly entered the jury room in order to find out the
numerical breakdown of the jury at that particular time and, on one
occasion, after indicating to the jury that he was tired and wanted
to go home, told them if they didn't come to a decision within a half
hour that "the court would give them the devil." The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court, in affirming the trial court's grant of a new
trial, pointed out that such coercive conduct was improper and
clearly justified a new trial.' 8
Another example of the willingness to grant a new trial upon
the showing of prejudice is found in Mix v. North America Co.19
After the jury had retired to deliberate the court officials in charge
of the jurors permitted several to play poker, one to leave the jury
room in order to obtain more money for the game, four to speak to
outside parties on the telephone, one to speak with his family on
the phone and others to visit the electrical bureau in city hall to have
its workings explained to them. 20 In granting a new trial the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court stated:
It has been said that the greatest object of civil gov-
ernment is to get 12 honest men in the jury box. If this is
true, after they get there they must be kept there, hedged
around not only with their own integrity, but with every
precaution against evil communication which may cor-
rupt them .... 21
To summarize the pre-1961 law of jury communications in Penn-
sylvania it would have to be said that it was an ad hoc approach ra-
ther than a pedantic approach. The court exhibited a willingness
to look closely at the facts of each case in order to determine if
prejudice had occurred. If it had, a new trial was granted without
hesitation. 22 If prejudice clearly had not occurred 23 or there was
merely an unsubstantiated possibility that it had,24 reversal was
withheld on the basis that even though a technical error had oc-
curred, there was not a sufficient quantum of error to justify a new
trial. No evidence could be found that the rule was anything but
a very fair guideline that served both litigants and the bench
well for many years.
III. POST-1961 APPROACH: PROPHYLACTIc RULE
The watershed proved to be, interestingly enough, the deci-
sion by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Glendenning v.
18. Id.
19. 209 Pa. 636, 59 A. 272 (1904).
20. There was also evidence in this case that there had been attempts
throughout the trial by unknown parties to influence several of the
j urors.
21. Mix v. North America Co., 209 Pa. 636, 645, 59 Pa. 272, 274 (1904).
22. E.g., Sommer v. Huber, 183 Pa. 162, 38 A. 595 (1897).
23. E.g., Altsman v. Kelly, 336 Pa. 481, 9 A.2d 423 (1939).




Sprowls,25 in which the actions of the trial judge were so reprehen-
sible that no appellate court could have ignored the harm and prej-
udice that resulted. 26 However, in granting a new trial Mr. Chief
Justice Bell, who wrote the opinion, chose some overly expansive
language which has proved unfortunate:
We strongly condemn any intrusion by a judge into the
jury room during the jury's deliberations, or any commu-
nication by a Judge with the jury without prior notice to
counsel, and such practice must be immediately stopped!27
While this uncompromising statement satisfied the entire court
in this case,2 8 a majority of the court in later decisions2 9 zeroed in
on the "any communication" dictum of Glendenning to justify the
granting of a new trial upon the mere showing that any communica-
tion had occurred-regardless of the quantum of prejudice, if any,
resulting therefrom.
30
25. 405 Pa. 222, 174 A.2d 865 (1961).
26. Mr. Justice Musmanno, in a dissenting opinion in a later case, de-
scribed the actions of the trial judge in Glendenning in the following man-
ner:
In that case the judge physically went into the jury room. And
not only once. While the jury was deliberating, he entered into
their sanctuary of deliberation six different times! On one of these
visits he spoke to a juror and escorted him to the telephone so that
the latter could talk to his wife. In explaining how it came about
that he almost turned the passage between his chambers and the
jurors' quarters into a revolving door, the judge related that he
went into the jury room to provide the jurors with a pitcher of wa-
ter; to arrange for a ride home for a juror; to tell the jury to refrain
from arguing too loudly because they might be overheard; to allow
a juror to leave the jury room and telephone his jealous wife (!);
and to tell a juror that it was none of the jury's business when a
juror asked him if insurance had anything to do with the case.
Short of swinging a hammock in the jury room and undulating in
it to the rhythm of the jury's discussions, it is difficult to visualize
a more companionable association between judge and jury than
in the Glendenning case where the judge played water boy, trans-
portation clerk, and heart salver.
Argo v. Goodstein, 424 Pa. 612, 624-25, 228 A.2d 195, 201 (1967) (dissenting
opinion).
27. Glendenning v. Sprowls, 405 Pa. 222, 226, 174 A.2d 865, 867 (1961)
(emphasis added).
28. Glendenning is the last reported appellate decision in Pennsyl-
vania dealing with physical entry into the jury room by the trial judge. It
must be assumed therefore, that, at the present time a new trial will be
granted based on the entry itself and regardless of any prejudice considera-
tions. One exception to this rule is that the judge may enter the jury room
if accompanied by counsel: Glendenning v. Sprowls, 405 Pa. 222, 226, 174
A.2d 865, 867 (1961).
29. Argo v. Goodstein, 424 Pa. 612, 228 A.2d 195 (1967); Yarsunas v.
Boros, 423 Pa. 364, 223 A.2d 696 (1966); Kersey Mfg. Co. v. Rozic, 422 Pa.
564, 222 A.2d 713 (1966); Argiro v. Phillips Oil Co., 422 Pa. 433, 220 A.2d 654
(1966).
30. Mr. Justice Musmanno, in his dissent in Argo v. Goodstein, balked
at the majority's citing of Glendenning as authority for granting a new trial
A series of four cases3 1 decided within a nine month period by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court completed the transformation
from the "old rule" to the "new rule."32  Adopting what they re-
ferred to as a "prophylactic rule," these four decisions, waiving
the Glendenning dictum, older dictum 33 and each other as their
banners, granted new trials where admittedly innocuous communi-
cations between judge and jury were made without the knowledge
of counsel.
34
The prophylactic rule was best characterized by Mr. Justice
Cohen in his opinion in Argo v. Goodstein:35
The law in this Commonwealth is clear. Any inter-
course between the trial judge and deliberating jury, no
matter how innocuous, had in the absence of counsel
mandates the grant of a new trial even in the absence of
prejudice to either party. 6
Commenting on the logic supporting the "new rule," Mr. Jus-
tice Musmanno, in his dissenting opinion in Argo, wrote:
To drive the plaintiff in this case into another trial over
where there was merely "verbal entry."
The language of a Marc Antony at a Caesar's funeral cannot be
quoted as authority for a referee at a football game. To cite the
Glendenning case in support of the Majority's far-fetched thesis, is
like citing Webster's Reply to Hayne at a bingo controversy.
424 Pa. 612, 624, 228 A.2d 195, 201 (1967).
31. Cases cited note 29 supra.
32. This Comment will use the following terms interchangeably to de-
scribe the current position of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court relating to
jury communications: "new rule," "majority rule" and "prophylactic rule."
33. Hunsicker v. Waidelich, 302 Pa. 224, 153 A. 335 (1931); Sommer v.
Huber, 183 Pa. 162, 38 A. 595 (1897).
34. The appellant in Argo v. Goodstein included in his brief the fol-
lowing description of the communications in the three earlier decisions:
1. In Gould (this case is officially cited as Argiro v. Phillips Oil
Co., 422 Pa. 433, 220 A.2d 654), the jury requested factual infor-
mation and the Court responded:
'You must remember that testimony as given by the wit-
nesses on the witness stand.'
In Kersey (422 Pa. 564, 222 A.2d 713), the jury expressed in-
ability to agree to which the Trial Judge responded:
'Continue your deliberations. Review the evidence and
come to a decision to the Best of your Judgment.'
In Yarsunas (423 Pa. 364, 223 A.2d 696) the Jury asked irrele-
vant questions to which the Trial Judge responded:
... you are to consider only those matters which I dis-
cussed in my charge to you.'
It would unduly tax the imagination to invent three more in-
nocuous, harmless or less prejudicial instructions.
Brief for Appellant on Reargument at 4 n.1, Argo, v. Goodstein, 424 Pa. 612,
228 A.2d 195 (1967).
35. 424 Pa. 612, 228 A.2d 195 (1967). In this case the jury sent a note to
the trial judge asking for directions on the proper method of filling out the
verdict slip when liability has been found against joint defendants. The
trial judge returned the following reply:
If you find Defendant "A" negligent then you have a duty of fix-
ing the extent of "A's" liability.
If you find Defendant "B" also negligent then you must fix the
damages to which the Plaintiff is entitled from Defendant "B".




the picayunish incident, ballooned by the Majority into
imaginative terrorem, would be like requiring a patient
who has undergone surgery and has thoroughly recov-
ered from the anesthetic, the cutting, convalescing and
scarring, to undergo another operation because the doctor,
in performing the successful operation, wore black socks
instead of blue socks.3
7
In the same opinion, Mr. Justice Musmanno also commented on
the all-encompassing scope of the rule's coverage:
Suppose the jury sends to the judge a note with the
following question: "What time shall we break off for
lunch?" And the judge, without calling in counsel, sends
back a note with the two words: "Twelve o'clock." Ac-
cording to the Majority ruling in Gould v. Argiro, and its
ruling today, a new trial would have to be ordered because
the Judge did not call in counsel to confer with them as
to the time the jury might munch on a sandwich and swal-
low a piece of pie.
38
A sample case will better illustrate the working of the new rule.
In Argiro v. Phillips Oil Co.,39 a case involving cross-suits in tres-
pass, the deliberating jury sent a note to the trial judge asking the
following questions: "Since this was a dual transmission truck,
what gear was it in as it approached the top of the hill?" and "What
is the top union wage for welders?" Although the return note was
not preserved, the trial judge testified that he wrote in that note,
"You must remember the testimony as given by the witnesses on
the stand." The trial judge failed to inform counsel of his answer
before sending it back to the jury. However, before the jury re-
turned its verdict the judge did inform both attorneys of the
questions and his answer to them. Neither counsel objected at that
time to either the procedure followed or to the answer of the
judge.40 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, splitting 5-2, reversed
37. Id. at 622, 228 A.2d at 200 (dissenting opinion).
38. Id. at 623, 228 A.2d at 200 (dissenting opinion). However, Jus-
tice Musmanno proved to be a poor prognosticator. Two years later a
fact situation came before the court which was strikingly similar to his
tongue-in-cheek hypothetical. In O'Donnell v. Thayer, 434 Pa. 555, 252 A.2d
148 (1969), the court affirmed the lower court per curiam, recognizing the
existence of a "ministerial exception" to the prophylactic rule. See text
accompanying notes 100, 101 and 103 infra.
39. 422 Pa. 433, 220 A.2d 564 (1966).
40. It is worth noting that the majority opinion fails to place any sig-
nificance on the opportunity given counsel to object prior to the rendering
of the verdict. As can be seen by reading the opinions in many of these
cases, the court will ignore the timeliness of the objection in cases in which
it wants to rule on the primary issue raised. However, in other cases where
counsel has been given the pre-verdict opportunity to protest but the court
does not want to decide the jury communications issue, the court will hold
the judgments for defendant and remanded the cause for a new
trial. 4 1 Noting first that the old rule which had required the show-
ing of prejudice before a reversal could be had was no longer the
law, Mr. Justice Cohen cited "the potential impediments to a fair
proceeding inherent in these practices" regardless of any actual
prejudice as justification for a new trial.42 Thus, the majority of
the court chose to take a case, in which the prejudice resulting from
the trial judge's innocuous answer was at best negligible and grant
a new trial on the mere showing that the communication had
taken place and nothing else. The distinction between the "old
rule" and the "new rule" could not be more strikingly highlighted.
IV. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AND ARGUMENTS AGAINST
THE PROPHYLACTIc RULE
The members of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania who sup-
ported the adoption of the prophylactic rule have tendered many
reasons for their position .4  The following is a list of those reasons.
Following the list is an expanded discussion of each in light of the
criticisms made by the dissenting voices on the court44 and in light
of the viewpoint adopted by this Comment.
These reasons have been advanced by the majority to justify
the rule:
A) It is the duty of the trial judge not to secretly commu-
nicate with the jury;
B) Counsel must be informed of any such communication
since they may have suggestions for the trial judge's re-
ply or they may want to object to the proposed answer;
C) The "prophylactic rule" is made mandatory on the au-
thority of Glendenning v. Sprowls;
45
D) Reversible error is committed if the text of the com-
munication is not made a part of the record;
that, by failing to object at trial, all opportunity to have the issue decided on
appeal has been waived. Compare Argo v. Goodstein, 424 Pa. 612, 228 A.2d
195 (1967), and Argiro v. Phillips Oil Co., 422 Pa. 433, 220 A.2d 654 (1966)
(where the court discussed the issue even though counsel failed to object a
trial) with Dejohn v. Orell, 429 Pa. 359, 240 A.2d 472 (1968), and Lobalzo v.
Varoli, 422 Pa. 5, 220 A.2d 634 (1966) (where counsel was held to have
waived his objection). Note that Argiro and Lobalzo were decided on the
same day!
41. The Argiro majority was made up of Justice Cohen, who wrote the
majority opinion, Justices Eagen, Jones and O'Brien, The dissenters were
Justice Musmanno and Chief Justice Bell. Justice Roberts wrote a concur-
ring opinion with which he later disassociated himself: Yarsunas v. Boros,
423 Pa. 364, 368, 223 A.2d 696, 698 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
42. 422 Pa. at 434, 220 A.2d at 655 (1966).
43. For the purposes of this discussion, the "majority" consists of Jus-
tices Cohen, Jones, Eagen and O'Brien for they were most responsible for
the adoption of the "majority rule."
44. For the purposes of this discussion, the "dissenters" are Chief Jus-
tice Bell, Justice Musmanno and Justice Roberts.
45. 405 Pa. 222, 174 A.2d 865 (1961).
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E) The ad hoc rule was unfair in that no one can calculate
the true effect of any communication on the jury;
F) The concept of a prophylactic rule has long been recog-
nized in Pennsylvania;
G) To permit secret communications is to sanction judges
engaging in clandestine activities thereby calling into ques-
tion the integrity of the individual trial judge and the en-
tire judicial system; and
H) Guidelines for trial judges must be established and
rigidly enforced in order to eliminate all possible prejudice.
A. Communicating With Jury Is a Breach of Trial Judge's Duty
The majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court argues that
whenever a trial judge secretly communicates with the jury he has
breached his duty to conduct a fair and impartial trial.46 They
reason further that the breach of this duty justifies the granting of a
new trial, in all cases, to the party purportedly adversely affected
by it.
47
On first reading, such an argument is reasonably attractive.
Without question, the trial judge does have the responsibility to
provide an atmosphere in which each of the litigants can present
his case in its most favorable light. However, when all the factors
have been analyzed, it becomes readily apparent that the underly-
ing purpose of the duty has not been violated where the trial judge
has communicated with the jury but no prejudice has arisen to ei-
ther party from such communication. It is one thing to say that
there should be reversal when there has been a prejudicial secret
communication. No one, including the minority, disputes this. In
such a case, besides causing harm to one or both parties, the trial
judge has also breached the duty to conduct a fair trial.48 But
where the element of harm or prejudice is not present, granting a
new trial merely because of a technical violation of this duty when
no one has been shown to have been harmed by it is an unneces-
sarily rigorous adherence to principle, which only contributes to al-
ready crowded court dockets. 49 To reverse on such tenuous grounds
46. Kersey Mfg. Co. v. Rozic, 422 Pa. 564, 568, 222 A.2d 713, 714 (1966);
Argiro v. Phillips Oil Co., 422 Pa. 433, 435, 220 A.2d 654, 655 (1966).
47. Id.
48. Glendenning v. Sprowls, 405 Pa. 222, 174 A.2d 865 (1961), discussed
supra, is the classic example of prejudice resulting from the actions of the
trial judge.
49. Mr. Justice Roberts, in his dissent in Argo, states:
The majority concedes that its new rule produced this appeal.
Undoubtedly it will generate many other appeals equally without
merit, further burdening this Court as well as the trial courts.
is, in the words of Mr. Justice Roberts, "an unnecessary reproach to
the trial judge" 50 and the humiliating removal of his luxury of mak-
ing a simple, understandable and nonprejudicial mistake.5 '
A very significant aspect of this whole question, which the ma-
jority has not addressed itself to in its opinions, is the effect of the
reversal on the litigants. It cannot be disputed that the whole trial
experience is an emotionally and financially draining affair to the
parties involved. They should be compelled to repeat the process
only when relitigation is clearly justified due to some event that has
tainted the accuracy of the original verdict. But to both force the
appellee and tantalize the appellant into a new trial where the
original one had produced a result which cannot be challenged on
anything but the most tenuous of grounds is to work a grave injus-
tice on the parties concerned. As the minority has asked, what sit-
uation could justify more the application of the harmless error prin-
ciple?
5 2
B. Trial Judge Must Inform Counsel of the Communication
Another argument put forth by the majority to support the
prophylactic rule is that when the jury has communicated with the
trial judge he must inform counsel in order to give them a chance
to suggest possible answers to the question. In addition, such a
procedure allows counsel the opportunity to object to the answer
the judge finally sends the jury.53 Failure to give counsel this op-
portunity is grounds for granting a new trial according to the ma-
jority.
5 4
Again, this is a very appealing argument on first examination.
If a party has chosen to employ counsel for a court proceeding
then it naturally follows that the attorney should be consulted about
any matter affecting his client's case. When the court fails to in-
form counsel of an event in the case it deprives the client of his le-
424 Pa. 612, 631, 228 A.2d 195, 198 (1967). Of course, it must be pointed out
that such a "floodgates" argument has only temporary viability for as soon
as the rule gains sufficient notoriety it is followed more frequently thus au-
tomatically reducing the number of appeals.
50. Yarsunas v. Boros, 423 Pa. 364, 368, 223 A.2d 696, 698 (1966) (dis-
senting opinion).
51. Kersey Mfg. Co. v. Rozic, 422 Pa. 564, 572, 222 A.2d 713, 717 (1966).
52. Argo v. Goodstein, 424 Pa. 612, 623, 228 A.2d 195, 200 (1967) (Mus-
manno's dissenting opinion). The validity of the argument that the prophy-
lactic rule holds out false hope to an appellant who obtains a reversal on
the basis of a nonprejudicial communication between trial judge and jury
was illustrated by the result of the retrial in Argo. Plaintiff had obtained
a verdict in the first trial of $27,500. However, the verdict was set aside af-
ter defendant-appellant successfully argued the jury communications issue.
The second trial resulted in a verdict of $38,000; Argo v. Goodstein, 438 Pa.
468, 265 A.2d 783 (1970). See note 35 supra.
53. Kersey Mfg. Co. v. Rozic, 422 Pa. 564, 568, 222 A.2d 713, 714-15




gal representation. If such a deprivation adversely affects the client,
reversible error has occurred. However, where the trial judge has
kept counsel informed of all proceedings, or where the utilization
of such procedure would have been of no value to the client, the ra-
tionale for reversal vanishes. When the four cases responsible for
the adoption of the new rule are closely examined, it becomes ap-
parent that in two of the cases the equivalent of this right was pro-
vided55 and in the other two such procedure would have been mean-
ingless.5 6 In Argo and Argiro the trial judge admittedly answered
the notes from the jury without consulting counsel. However, in
both cases the judge informed counsel of his actions before the jury
returned the verdict. Therefore counsel had an opportunity to ob-
ject at a time when the jury could have been reinstructed. No ob-
jection was made at that time. To call this procedure justification
for a new trial is to honor form over common sense. Since no objec-
tion was made when the opportunity was given it is highly unlikely
that an objection to the same words would have been made an hour
earlier.
57
In the two instances where the attorneys were not given an
opportunity to scrutinize the communications prior to the rendering
of the verdict, it is impossible to imagine just what type of an ob-
jection could have been made. The correspondence taken as a
whole was so innocuous, as admitted by the majority, that one can-
not imagine where the error was committed that justified the grant-
ing of a new trial."'
Another interesting aspect of this question is a point frequently
made by Mr. Chief Justice Bell, a strong advocate of the minority
view. It is his contention that a party is entitled to have coun-
sel present at the answering of a query from the jury only when
the trial judge's answer amounts to an additional instruction and
not when it is merely a command to keep deliberating or a reiter-
ation of an instruction previously made in open court in the pres-
ence of the parties and counsel59 The majority answers this argu-
55. Argo v. Goodstein, 424 Pa. 612, 228 A.2d 195 (1967); Argiro v.
Phillips Oil Co., 422 Pa. 564, 222 A.2d 713 (1966).
56. Yarsunas v. Boros, 423 Pa. 364, 223 A.2d 696 (1966); Kersey Mfg.
Co. v. Rozic, 422 Pa. 564, 222 A.2d 713 (1966).
57. See note 40 supra for a discussion of how the court has manipulated
this procedural issue of timely objection in cases where it did not wish to
deal with the substantive issues presented.
58. A portion of the text of these communications is set out in note 34
supra.
59. Argo v. Goodstein, 424 Pa. 612, 617-18, 228 A.2d 195, 203 (1967)
(dissenting opinion); Yarsunas v. Boros, 423 Pa. 364, 367, 223 A.2d 696, 698
(1966) (dissenting opinion); Kersey Mfg. Co. v. Rozic, 422 Pa. 564, 572-73,
ment by pointing to the "any communication" language of Glen-
denning v. Sprowls.60  As noted earlier, such language-interest-
ingly enough written by Mr. Chief Justice Bell-carries only the
weight of dictum. As such it should not be considered controlling,
particularly where such an important decision as the granting of
a new trial, with its attendant hardships, is at issue.
61
C. Glendenning Decision Dictates a Prophylactic Rule
As pointed out above, the Glendenning decision involves a sit-
uation where the trial judge physically entered the jury room
six different times. 6 2 The argument that this prejudice-laden fac-
tual situation dictates the establishment of a prophylactic rule in
a case where the jury and the trial judge exchange harmless notes
was met head-on by Mr. Justice Musmanno when he wrote:
To cite Glendenning as authority for ordering a new trial
because a Judge transmits two inconsequential greetings
to the jury is to use a sledge hammer to kill a fly.
63
D. Error Is Committed Unless the Communications Are Made Part
of the Record
It is true that instructions to the jury must be made part of the
record. 64 However, as the Chief Justice points out, the commu-
nications involved in the reported cases have not been instructions
in the common usage of that term.65 Even if that point is ignored,
a more basic question arises. If a party is given an opportunity to
object to the communication prior to the rendering of the ver-
dict and he fails to voice an objection at that time, what possible
error could accrue from the fact the writings were not made part of
the record particularly in light of the rule that failure to object at
trial waives the right to object on appeal? 66 As Mr. Justice Rob-
erts has repeatedly pointed out, a party should not be allowed to sit
idly by, making no objections and taking his chances on a favorable
verdict, and when his gamble loses to object to a purported error
that could have been corrected at trial.
6 7
222 A.2d 713, 714-15 (1966) (dissenting opinion). See also Argiro v. Phillips
Oil Co., 422 Pa. 433, 438, 220 A.2d 564, 567 (1966) (Justice Musmanno's dis-
senting opinion).
60. 405 Pa. 222, 174 A.2d 865 (1961).
61. See text accompanying notes 25-30 supra.
62. Id.
63. Argiro v. Phillips Oil Co., 422 Pa. 433, 441, 220 A.2d 654, 658
(1966) (dissenting opinion).
64. Kersey Mfg. Co. v. Rozic, 422 Pa. 564, 569, 222 A.2d 713, 715 (1966).
65. Cases cited note 59 supra.
66. See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra.
67. Kersey Mfg. Co. v. Rozic, 422 Pa. 564, 571, 222 A.2d 713, 715 (1966)
(concurring opinion); Lobalzo v. Varoli, 422 Pa. 5, 8, 220 A.2d 634, 636
(1966) (concurring opinion). See also Justice Musmanno's dissenting opin-
ion in Argiro v. Phillips Oil Co., 422 Pa. 433, 437-39, 220 A.2d 654, 657 (1966).
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Finally, as Justice Musamanno has pointed out, if there is no
dispute as to what was actually said or written, it is only a tech-
nicality to require the communications to be placed on the record.68
To go even farther by granting a new trial because the undisputed
communication is not of record is even a harder position to jus-
tify.
E. Inherent Unfairness of an Ad Hoc Rule
Another argument made in support of the majority's rule is
that the alternative, the ad hoc approach, is so inherently unfair
to the litigants that its use would be abhorrent to justice.0 9 Of
course the ad hoc approach was used in this state for over a hundred
years until the mid-1960's; any catastrophe resulting from its use
is not apparent. The rationale of the majority in rejecting the "old
rule" apparently is that no one can calculate the effect that a ju-
dicial communication--even a seemingly harmless one-has upon
the minds of each juror or upon the jury collectively.70 Therefore,
because the effect is immeasurable, any possibility that the wrong
impression may result must be eliminated by placing a total em-
bargo on those communications regardless of their harmless out-
ward appearance.
71
It is certainly true that no one can calculate the precise effect
that a note from the judge might have on the jury. However,
the majority's rule is based on the assumption that every emotion
of each juror should be controlled as if the entire process of litiga-
tion were carried on in a vacuum. The jury can be protected
from improper impression only up to a certain logical point. To
order reversal on the basis of a mere possibility that a juror may
have interpreted a perfectly correct and perfectly harmless note
differently than 99% of all other jurors would have is pure folly.
The senselessness of such an action is underscored even more when
viewed in terms of the time, expense and emotion required to con-
duct a retrial.
7 2
68. Argiro v. Phillips Oil Co., 422 Pa. 433, 439, 220 A.2d 64, 68 (1966),
wherein Justice Musmanno refers to this requirement as being "Much Ado
About Nothing."
69. Kersey Mfg. Co. v. Rozic, 422 Pa. 564, 569, 222 A.2d 713, 715 (1966);
Glendenning v. Sprowls, 405 Pa. 222, 224, 174 A.2d 865, 867 (1961).
70. Id.
71. There is early dictum to this effect in Hunsicker v. Waidelich,
302 Pa. 224, 242, 153 A. 335, 337 (1931).
72. E.g., Justice Roberts in his concurring opinion in Kersey Mfg. Co.
v. Rozic, 422 Pa. 564, 472, 222 A.2d 713, 717 (1966), states:
By imposing a per se rule, the loss falls upon the successful party
below, who in all probability will prevail on retrial, although he
F. The Prophylactic Rule Has Been Long Recognized in Pennsyl-
vania
This argument is correct; Pennsylvania courts have always rec-
ognized that it is improper for the jury and the trial judge or any
other court officer to communicate secretly.3 However, at this
point the majority refuses to recognize the distinction between con-
trolling authority and dictum.7 4  As discussed earlier, the old rule
recognized the general rule but felt that it justified the granting of a
new trial only where the communication was of such a prejudicial
nature that it had affected the right of the parties to a fair trial.76
Then and only then, was the prophylactic nature of the rule
utilized.
76
G. Court Will Not Sanction Secret Communications and Clandes-
tine Activities by Trial Judge
The best discussion of this argument is provided by the court
itself. The majority opinion in Argo v. Goodstein,77 written
by Mr. Justice Cohen, presents one side of the argument.
As we indicated in Yarsunas, Kersey, and Gould, the
rule enunciated by us is and must be prophylactic. The un-
savory overtones of clandestine instructions from judge
to jury are so obviously unfair to judges, lawyers and liti-
gants that no other approach than an absolute prohibition
is warranted. To approach this problem on an ad hoc ba-
sis, as some members of this court have advocated, is to
expose the judicial system to baseless speculation by the
general public as to the honesty and integrity of its mem-
bers.
78
will have been forced to expend additional time and money, and
on other litigants whose cases will be delayed because of the addi-
tion to trial court backlog.
73. A good example is the early case of Earon v. Mackey wherein the
court stated: "If it was so communicated to the jury, not then in the pres-
ence of the court, the proceeding was irregular and erroneous...." 106
Pa. 452, 458 (1884). However, as in most of the early decisions, such a broad
statement proved to be only dictum in the case as the court, in spite of its
strong language, refused to grant a new trial.
74. Numerous early examples can be shown where a court first set out
the general rule that the secret communication was erroneous but then
backed off from so holding because of lack of prejudice shown or improper
objection by counsel: Sapsara v. People's Cab Co., 381 Pa. 241, 113 A.2d 278
(1955); Sebastianelli v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 337 Pa. 466, 12 A.2d
113 (1940); Altsman v. Kelly, 336 Pa. 481, 9 A.2d 423 (1939); Hunsicker v.
Waidelich, 302 Pa. 224, 153 A. 335 (1931); Allegro v. Rural Valley Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 268 Pa. 33, 112 A. 140 (1920); Earon v. Mackey, 106 Pa. 142 (1884);
Kersey Mfg. Co. v. Rozic, 207 Pa. Super. 182, 215 A.2d 323 (1965), rev'd, 422
Pa. 564, 222 A.2d 713 (1966); Krywucki v. Trommer, 199 Pa. Super. 145, 184
A.2d 389 (1962); Noreika v. Pa. Indem. Corp., 135 Pa. Super. 474, 5 A.2d 619
(1939); Knight v. Showers, 87 Pa. D. & C. 105 (C.P. Elk 1953).
75. See text accompanying notes 11-13 supra.
76. Id.
77. 424 Pa. 612, 228 A.2d 195 (1967).
78. Id. at 616, 228 A.2d at 196.
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This argument was vigorously attacked by Justice Musmanno
in his dissenting opinion in the same case:
It will be seen here that plaintiff's counsel was present
and defendants' counsel does not deny he was present.
Where, then, is the "secrecy" of which the Majority speaks?
The Majority indulges itself in extravagant language....
What was "unsavory" in this case and on what basis
may the Majority besmirch the name of trial judges by sug-
gesting that the general public will question their "honesty
and integrity?" '79
Justice Musmanno continued later in the opinion:
Defendants' counsel stood by and watched the entire
performance as clearly revealed as if it were taking place
within a fish bowl. On what basis, then, does the Majority
use such misleading and derogatory words as "clandes-
tine" and "secret?" A repetition of those words does not
transform sunshine into darkness or above-ground actions
into subterranean operations.
80
H. Guidelines for Trial Judges Must Be Established and Rigidly
Enforced
The argument that there should be specific guidelines for advis-
ing trial judges and that a reversal should be had when these guide-
lines are violated is possibly the strongest argument in favor of the
prophylactic rule.8 1 Admittedly the rule is one of easy application:
upon the mere showing of the existence of a communication, a new
trial is to be granted regardless of any other circumstance. To
the credit of the rule there can certainly be no dispute over whether
the rule is to be invoked in a given situation since its application is
mandatory. The procedural certainty it embodies seems logical.
Eventually, the desired result will be reached-the complete eradi-
cation of secret communications. But should a rule be evaluated
entirely on the basis that it can be administered easily without giv-
ing some regard to the need for such a rule or to the effect it has
on the litigants? It must be remembered that an inescapable by-
product of the prophylactic rule is that some new trials will be
granted where they are not justified by the facts. Thus, it should
be determined if this is an acceptable price to pay for the corres-
ponding benefit that all cases involving prejudice will be properly
reversed. The purpose of the prophylactic rule is the complete elim-
ination of prejudicial secret communications between judge and
79. Id. at 620-21, 228 A.2d at 199 (quotation omitted).
80. Id. at 621, 228 A.2d at 199.
81. Yarsunas v. Boros, 423 Pa. 364, 367, 223 A.2d 696, 697 (1966).
jury; its application has been made all-inclusive only because the
court believed it was either unwise or impossible to attempt to de-
termine on a case-by-case basis the presence or absence of preju-
dice.8 2  This would seem to indicate that the court was con-
cerned that the ad hoc approach was permitting at least some cases
to slip by which justified reversal. But such a position cannot be
supported. No reported case has been found which has involved
a prejudicial written communication between judge and jury. In-
stead the cases have dealt exclusively with innocuous exchanges.
From this fact one of two conclusions can be drawn. It could be
argued that such a factual situation has never occurred in Pennsyl-
vania. If this were true, and it is highly illogical that it is, the
reason for the use of a prophylactic rule quickly vanishes for it
seems a little foolish to have a rule applicable to situations which
never materialize. The more logical explanation for the lack of a
case which would justify a prophylactic rule is that trial judges
have always been cognizant of the fact that they must not communi-
cate with the jury without the consent of counsel on matters of
substantive importance, Thus they have consistently refrained
from creating situations which would justify such an appeal.
If this is the case, the imposition of a prophylactic rule which erad-
icates all communications in order to assure that all prejudicial
communications will be dealt with properly, when all along trial
judges have refrained from such forbidden activity, is a clear ex-
ample of unfortunate and unnecessary judicial overkill. In addi-
tion, the rigid enforcement of such a rule is senseless when it places
such an onerous burden on the litigants8 3 and on the court cal-
endar.
8 4
A great deal of space has been devoted to analyzing and criti-
cizing the reasoning of the majority that has conceived the concept
of the prophylactic rule with regard to jury communications. This
expanded treatment makes it clear that the prophylactic rule,
when placed in its most favorable light, is at best a rule of question-
able merit. Its only positive feature is that virtually automatic re-
lief is provided to a litigant harmed by a prejudicial communica-
tion between trial judge and jury.8 5 However, the ad hoc approach
unquestionably reached this same goal.
82. Kersey Mfg. Co. v. Rozic, 422 Pa. 564, 569, 222 A.2d 713, 715 (1966).
83. Argo v. Goodstein, 424 Pa. 612, 622, 228 A.2d 195, 199-200 (1967)
(Justice Musmanno's dissenting opinion).
The Majority would compel this plaintiff without sight to un-
dergo the privation and suffering of a new trial, groping his way
through another battle in court, only so that the Majority may
claim to the world that it is putting into effect a "prophylactic
rule."
84. Yarsunas v. Boros, 423 Pa. 364, 367, 223 A.2d 696, 698 (1966) (Chief
Justice Bell's dissenting opinion).
In my judgment, the law now established by the majority is un-
realistic, unfair to society, and will substantially increase litiga-
tion which we are striving to reduce.
85. Since the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has adopted the new
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Thus, the legacy of the majority's decision to convert from the
ad hoc rule to the prophylactic rule will undoubtedly be the follow-
ing: (1) the embarrassment of conscientious trial judges; (2) the
glorification of meritless abstract principle over common sense; (3)
the further addition to already swollen court calendars; and (4) the
imposition of further expense, inconvenience and trauma on be-
wildered litigants.
V. A FUTURE TREND?
Several recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
can be interpreted as indicating that the court may be retreating
somewhat from the rigidity of the prophylactic rule.86 While there
has been no clear statement to this effect in any of the opinions, the
court has recognized that there are certain situations where a
new trial should not be granted on the mere showing that a com-
munication out of the earshot of counsel has taken place.
7
In Dejohn v. Orell,8s the first apparent retreat from the pro-
phylactic rule, the jury sent a note to the trial judge asking a ques-
tion concerning damages which it might permissibly assess. The
judge answered the note without consulting counsel. Shortly there-
after a second interrogatory was sent to the judge who then sum-
moned counsel, read to them both notes, the first answer he had
sent and the second answer he planned to send. No objection was
made at the time. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff. The
trial judge granted defendant's subsequent motion for a new trial,
prophylactic rule, no case has been decided which has involved a communi-
cation between the jury and a court official other than the trial judge (i.e.,
tipstaff, bailiff or court crier). O'Donnell v. Thayer, discussed infra, dealt
with a situation where the tipstaff consulted with the jury but there it was
at the direction of the trial judge.
Prior to the adoption of the new rule, the ad hoc rule was applied in the
cases involving intercourse between the jury and a minor court official:
Nyce v. Muffley, 384 Pa. 107, 119 A.2d 530 (1956); Brainard v. Patterson,
342 Pa. 465, 21 A.2d 29 (1941); Welshire v. Bruaw, 331 Pa. 392, 220 A. 67
(1938).
If such a case arose today, the court presumably would apply the pro-
phylactic rule. But see Commonwealth v. Milliner, - Pa. -, 276 A.2d 520
(1971), a recent criminal case, where the court, with only Justices Roberts
and Eagen dissenting, held that a communication between a court crier and
the jury did not justify the granting of a new trial. See text accompanying
notes 119-21 infra.
86. Murphy v. Taylor, 440 Pa. 186, 269 A.2d 486 (1970); O'Donnell v.
Thayer, 434 Pa. 555, 252 A.2d 148 (1969); O'Donnell v. Bachelor, 429 Pa. 498,
240 A.2d 484 (1968); Dejohn v. Orell, 429 Pa. 359, 240 A.2d 472 (1968).
87. However, in several of the cases cited in note 86 supra, numerous
justices dissented without opinion or merely concurred in the result.
Therefore a precise determination of any trend is virtually impossible.
88. 429 Pa. 359, 240 A.2d 472 (1968).
citing as authority the four "prophylactic rule" cases.8 9 The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court, while affirming the new trial order on
other grounds, refused to go along with the trial court on the jury
communications issueY0 The majority opinion, written by Justice
Musmanno for a divided court,91 held that the prophylactic rule
was not applicable since the appellant's attorney had approved the
notes, the law had been properly stated in the notes, and no one had
been harmed by the notes.92 This case is noteworthy because
prior to this decision the prophylactic rule was held to be applica-
ble whether or not the attorney had previously been given the
chance to object, 3 whether or not the note contained a correct
statement of the law and finally, whether or not anyone had been
harmed.". 4 Thus, while there is no talk in the opinion of a return to
an ad hoc approach, the decision is certainly an encouraging move-
ment away from the harshness of the prophylactic rule.
The second decision is significant more for what it fails to say
than for what it does say. In O'Donnell v. Bachelor,9 5 decided
about the same time as Dejohn, the jury simply stated in a note to
the trial judge that it was deadlocked on contributory negligence to
which the judge replied that they should continue deliberating un-
til 6:00 P.M. Counsel was not informed of the exchange. The
court, again speaking through Justice Musmanno, granted plain-
tiff-appellant a new trial on grounds other than the judicial com-
munication.90 While never specifically mentioning this issue in the
opinion, he did note that there were other reasons presented by
the plaintiff as to why a new trial should be granted but that "they
do not of themselves represent errors justifying a new trial."9 7 How-
ever, Justice Cohen concurred solely on the basis of the prophylactic
rule.98 Interestingly enough, Justice Roberts, an advocate of the ad
hoc approach, reminded the court in his dissenting opinion that the
prophylactic rule was still the law and they were duty-bound to
apply it1 9 This case can not be given more importance as an indica-
tion of a trend away from the prophylactic rule since counsel never
raised the issue until his oral argument before the appellate court
-clearly an untimely objection.
A third case establishes a definite exception to the prophylac-
89. Cases cited note 29 supra.
90. 429 Pa. 359, 366, 240 A.2d 472, 476 (1968).
91. Mr. Justice Jones was the lone dissenter. Justices Cohen, Eagen
and O'Brien concurred in the result.
92. 429 Pa. 359, 366, 240 A.2d 472, 479 (1968).
93. See text accompanying notes 65-67 supra.
94. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
95. 429 Pa. 498, 240 A.2d 484 (1968).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 508, 240 A.2d at 488.
98. Id. at -, 240 A.2d at -.
99. Id. at 512, 240 A.2d at 490.
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tic rule. O'Donnell v. Thayer'00 involved a situation where the
judge with the express assent of both counsel and in accordance with
the custom in Chester County had the tipstaff twice ask the jury
whether or not they were close to reaching a verdict in order
that dinner reservations could be made for them.'0 ' Following the
second inquiry the jury came to a decision. A motion for a new
trial was made and denied. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
affirmed per curiam' 0 ' without filing an opinion.' 0 3 The failure
of the court to expand on its reasons for affirming is regrettable.
However, without stretching the imagination too far it can be as-
sumed that the court agreed with the following logical reasoning
of the lower court:
We cannot believe the Justices of the Supreme Court,
some of whom at least presided at jury trials in earlier
days, meant that ministerial functions as to juries should
be discontinued. For they must realize total lack of com-
munication between tipstaff and jury is impossible, nor can
they be returned to the courtroom for formal communi-
cation to such queries as lavatory facilities, extra pads and
pencils, directions and guidance to the hotel restaurant, etc.
and etc.
We query the extent of the application of the ban on
communication between court and jury. Where material
inquiries from the jury occur counsel are on call and are
consulted. However, neither time, practicability nor desires
of counsel themselves permit assembly of court and inter-
ruption of other trials or business by court or counsel for
routine matters affecting jury needs. 0 4
Thus, by affirming the lower court's decision, the supreme
court has apparently lessened the rigidity of the prophylactic rule
at least with regard to ministerial functions. Since Justices Cohen
and Eagen dissented, also without filing opinions, it is reasonable
speculation, in light of their prior positions, to say that their dis-
sent was based on their opposition to any inroad, no matter how
slight, on the prophylactic rule.
The most recent case dealing with the subject of jury communi-
cations was Murphy v. Taylor, 5' a personal injury action. The
100. 434 Pa. 555, 252 A.2d 148 (1969).
101. Note the uncanny resemblance that this case bears to a hypotheti-
cal posed by Justice Musmanno two years earlier in Argo v. Goodstein.
See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
102. 434 Pa. 555, 252 A.2d 148 (1969).
103. The lower court opinion denying a motion for a new trial is re-
ported at 16 Chester 233 (Pa. C.P. 1968).
104. Id. at 241, 242.
105. 440 Pa. 186, 269 A.2d 486 (1970).
pertinent facts of the case are that the jury sent a note to the judge
stating that it had found for the plaintiff but no amount had yet
been reached and when it was, what was the proper method of in-
dicating the amount on the verdict slip. The judge, without con-
sulting counsel, answered the note. Counsel was, however, in-
formed before the jury returned to deliver its verdict and no ob-
jection was made. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, with only
one dissent,10 6 refused to grant a new trial stating that it doubted
that this was the type of instruction to which the prophylactic
rule is applicable even in light of the earlier language used in Yar-
sunas v. Boros"1 7 that the rule covered "any instruction."108
One additional fact makes the Murphy case less significant
than it first seems. As in O'Donnell v. Bachelor,0 9 counsel never
objected to the communication until his oral argument before the
court, ignoring it in his new trial motions and in his written brief.
Thus, although the court stated it felt the prophylactic rule was
not applicable, it didn't have to decide the point because of the un-
timeliness of the objection. 1 0
From the four recent cases discussed above it is possible to dis-
cern a trend away from the harshest aspects of the prophylactic
rule. Clearly the ministerial exception of O'Donnell v. Thayer,"'
and the refusal to reverse unless the objection was timely raised
are steps in the right direction. However, the perfect test case
has not yet come before the court: a case in which there was a non-
prejudicial jury communication about which counsel was not in-
formed until after the verdict and to which he makes timely ob-
jection. When those facts are before the court there will be no op-
portunity for equivocation. Then, and only then, will it be known
if the court plans to relax its application of the prophylactic rule in
those cases where the communication is in no way prejudicial.
VI. THE CrviL RULE V. THE CRIMINAL RULE
A very interesting sidelight to the court's adoption of the pro-
phylactic rule with regard to jury communications in civil cases is
that the same development has not taken place on the criminal side
of the court.
112
While the recent criminal case law on point is sparse, ap-
parently the court has chosen to retain the ad hoc rule." 3 Given
the same fact situation involving the exchange of communications by
106. The late Mr. Justice Cohen was the lone dissenter.
107. 423 Pa. 364, 366, 223 A.2d 696, 697 (1966).
108. Murphy v. Taylor, 440 Pa. 186, 192, 269 A.2d 486, 489 (1970).
109. 429 Pa. 498, 240 A.2d 484 (1968).
110. Murphy v. Taylor, 440 Pa. 186, 192-93, 269 A.2d 486, 489 (1970).
111. 434 Pa. 555, 252 A.2d 148 (1969).
112. See Justice Roberts' dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v.Milli-
ner, - Pa. -, 276 A.2d 520, 523 (1971).
113. Commonwealth v. Milliner, - Pa. -, 276 A.2d 520 (1971).
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judge and jury without the knowledge of counsel, the disposition on
appeal will depend on whether the case is civil or criminal."
14
If a civil case, under the prophylactic rule, a new trial will be
automatically granted regardless of the nature of the communica-
tion.115 However, if the case is criminal a new trial will be granted
only upon the showing that the communication was prejudicial. 116
In other words, the present ad hoc approach in criminal cases is
the same as the rule in civil cases' 7 was prior to the adoption of
the prophylactic rule.""
Though only one criminal case has been decided since the ma-
jority's adoption of the stringent rule in civil cases, this decision is
indicative of the court's desire to retain a more enlightened and
logical approach to the problem. In Commonwealth v. Milliner,1 9
the jury had been deliberating for several hours when the foreman
asked the court crier if the defendant, charged with rape, had made
a statement at the time he was arrested. The court crier replied he
didn't know and even if he did he could not have told him. He then
asked the foreman if the jury desired further instruction to which
the foreman replied in the negative. An hour and a half later the
same situation repeated itself except this time the jury desired
further instruction. The court and the attorneys then met to discuss
possible methods of further instructing the jury. However, before
they came to any conclusion the jury reported that it had agreed
upon a verdict and found the defendant guilty. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, in affirming the judgment of sentence,
stated that the remarks of the court crier had been correct and not
prejudicial. 120 In addition, the court pointed to the fact that ap-
114. See note 85 supra.
115. E.g., Argo v. Goodstein, 424 Pa. 612, 228 A.2d 195 (1967). Of course,
some of the recent inroads into the rule must be considered. E.g., O'Donnell
v. Thayer, 434 Pa. 555, 252 A.2d 148 (1969) (impliedly adopting ministerial
exception).
116. Commonwealth v. Milliner, - Pa. -, 276 A.2d 520 (1971); Com-
monwealth v. Ballem, 386 Pa. 20, 123 A.2d 728 (1967), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
932 (1956); Commonwealth v. Kelly, 292 Pa. 418, 141 A. 246 (1928); Com-
monwealth ex rel. Comer v. Maroney, 178 Pa. Super. 633, 116 A.2d 301
(1955).
117. Kersey Mfg. Co. v. Rozic, 207 Pa. Super. 182, 187 n.2, 215 A.2d 323,
325 n.2 (1965), rev'd, 422 Pa. 564, 222 A.2d 713 (1966).
118. The positions taken by other jurisdictions in both civil and crimi-
nal cases are collected in two separate annotations. See generally Annot., 41
A.L.R.2d 227 (1955) (criminal) and Annot., 41 A.LR.2d 288 (1955) (civil).
119. - Pa. -,276 A.2d 520 (1971).
120. Id. at -, 276 A.2d at 522 (1971). The court cited a recent United
States Supreme Court case, Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966), as an
example of a case where prejudice actually had occurred. However, that
case is clearly distinguishable from the Milliner facts since harmful corn-
pellant's counsel had made no objection when given the opportunity
prior to the recording of the verdict.
-'2 1
It must be pointed out that this same court on previous occasions
in civil cases granted new trials even where the communication was,
as here, harmless and counsel was, as here, given the opportunity
to object at the trial.1 22 The logic of the court in adopting a stricter
rule in civil cases than in criminal cases must be severely criti-
cized. Assume arguendo, that the prophylactic concept must be
applied in one of the two cases. Isn't it almost beyond question
that the more rigid rule should be applied in criminal cases where
more than a monetary penalty is often at stake? Greater scrutiny
of seemingly harmless occurrences should be employed in criminal
cases where the defendant's life or liberty is at stake than in civil
suits where a money judgment (even one which is financially
crippling) is the greatest penalty to be suffered.
Mr. Justice Roberts, in his Milliner dissent, answered these
questions in the following way:
The majority asserts that the court crier's remarks to
the jury were "not harmful to appellant." However, a
majority of this Court has held in a series of civil cases that
any communication from the judge to the jury in the ab-
sence of counsel requires the granting of a new trial, no mat-
ter how innocuous or nonprejudicial that communication
might have been .... There is certainly no justification
for our being any less scrupulous in insulating a criminal
jury from any improper influence, and while I remain un-
persuaded as to the wisdom of this prophylactic rule, if a
majority of this Court is to apply that rule in civil trials it
should likewise be applied in criminal trials where liberty
or even life itself is at stake. It does not matter that the
above cases all involved communications by a judge
whereas this case involves jury conversations with a court
crier: remarks by a court crier are even less proper than
remarks by a judge in the absence of counsel.123
As pointed out by Justice Roberts, the fact that Milliner dealt
with a court crier-jury communication and that the civil cases
dealt with a judge-jury communication is clearly not a valid basis for
distinction. The purpose of both the prophylactic and the ad hoc
rules is to protect the jury from improper outside influence. 12 4 The
remarks of a court crier, who is, in the eyes of the jury, an integral
part of "the court," are as influential as those of a trial judge
and certainly more likely to be wrong or improper. Also it must
munication between the bailiff and the jury occurred prior to the time the
jury had retired to deliberate.
121. Id. at -, 276 A.2d at 522 (1971).
122. Cases cited note 55 supra.
123. - Pa. -, 276 A.2d 520, 523 (1971) (dissenting opinion) (foot-
note and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
124. Kersey Mfg. Co. v. Rozic, 422 Pa. 564, 572, 222 A.2d 713, 716 (1966)
(Justice Roberts' concurring opinion).
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be remembered that in several of the civil cases the trial judge's mes-
sage was conveyed to the jury by a lesser court official.
125
Finally, the dichotomy in treatment of jury communications in
civil and criminal cases clearly is in opposition to the view of the
majority of jurisdictions in the United States. In most states the
courts have been more willing to award a new trial in criminal cases,
when the sanctity of the jury room has been violated than they have
been for similar occurrences in civil cases.
126
VII. FEDERAL COURT PRACTICE
The federal courts' treatment of the problem of secret com-
munications between trial judge and jury in civil cases provides an
interesting counterpoint to the Pennsylvania position. While there
is some variation among the individual circuits, 127 the general rule
can best be described as occupying a middle ground between Penn-
sylvania's prophylactic rule and its ad hoc rule.
The most often cited opinion is Fillippon v. Albion Vein Slate
Co., 128 a 1919 decision of the United States Supreme Court. In that
personal injury action the jury sent a note to the judge asking if
contributory negligence was present under a certain stated set of
facts. The note was answered without first advising the parties or
their counsel and without first calling the jury into open court. Af-
ter the jury brought back a verdict for the defendant, the plaintiff,
who had learned of the communication prior to the verdict and who
had taken proper exception, made a motion for a new trial. The
motion was denied both by the trial court and the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals. 129 The Supreme Court reversed, stating that un-
less the additional instructions were affirmatively shown to be
harmless, the procedure followed by the trial judge in this case
was grounds for reversal.' 30 The Court went on to rule that error
125. E.g., Argiro v. Phillips Oil Co., 422 Pa. 433, 220 A.2d 654 (1966).
126. Annot., 41 A.L.R. 2d 229, 230 (1955).
While in civil cases the sanctity of the jury, including its pro-
tection from influence by the trial judge or other court officials or
attendants during its deliberations, is jealously guarded by the
courts, and in some jurisdictions by legislative enactment or rules
of procedure, in criminal cases there appears to be a tendency to
afford still greater protection, especially in those cases in which the
offense charged carries a severe penalty.
Id.
127. Compare General Motors Corp. v. Walden, 406 F.2d 606 (10th Cir.
1969), with Arrington v. Robertson, 114 F.2d 821 (3d Cir. 1940).
128. 250 U.S. 76 (1919).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 82.
in instructing the jury is presumptively erroneous.' 3'
The federal rule falls somewhere in between Pennsylvania's two
doctrines. It is more flexible than the prophylactic rule since provi-
sion is made for showing that no harm was done although the quan-
tum of proof to establish such harmless error is great.13 2 On the
other hand, the Fillippon rule is more rigid than a pure ad hoc ap-
proach since it embodies a virtual presumption of prejudice. In a
pure ad hoc situation there are no initial presumptions or inferences
-the facts of each case speak for themselves and control the disposi-
tion of each case.
13 3
Since the Fillippon decision many attempts have been made to
interpret the language of the decision as saying something it did
not really say. For example, some cases have attempted to cite
Fillippon as authority for a pure prophylactic rule.1 4 Others have
argued for its interpretation as a pure ad hoc rule.13 5 Clearly,
both purported interpretations are incorrect as the courts have rec-
ognized.
13 ,
One point that has been brought out very forcefully in the
federal decisions concerns the timeliness of the objection. Where
there has been communication between a deliberating jury and a
court official, if counsel for the party objecting to the procedure
knows of the communication prior to the verdict he must object to
the proceedings prior to verdict or the objection is deemed to be
waived.137 Pennsylvania courts would do well to clarify their
stance on this basic procedural question.
13
Finally, a recent Third Circuit decision recognized the necessity
of "administrative communications" between judge and jury.139
Such a procedure will be permitted by the court if three criteria are
met: (1) there is no reference to the specifics of the case; (2) the
communication itself must be collateral to the issues; and (3) the
communication must not be capable of affecting the deliberative
process in any matter.
40
131. Id.
132. Contra, text accompanying note 36 supra.
133. Contra, text accompanying note 12 supra.
134. Snyder v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 245 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1957); Ar-
rington v. Robertson, 114 F.2d 821 (3d Cir. 1940); cf. Snyder v. Lehigh Valley
R.R., 245 F.2d 112, 116 (3d Cir. 1957) (concurring opinion).
135. E.g., the contention of the defendant-appellee in Snyder.
136. After reviewing the conflicting authority, both civil and criminal,
the Eighth Circuit recently stated:
However, most courts now hold that the presumption of prejudice
resulting from such error is a rebuttable one and in some instances
may be overcome by evidence giving a clear indication of lack of
prejudice. This court has consistently followed this rule.
Rice v. United States, 356 F.2d 709, 717 (8th Cir. 1966).
137. Truscott v. Chaplin, 403 F.2d 644 (3d Cir. 1968); Gleeson v. Wood,
321 F. Supp. 118 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
138. See note 40 supra.





The experience of the federal courts can provide a valuable
guide for the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. While it is unlikely
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will ever return to the purely
ad hoc approach it utilized in civil cases prior to 1961, the court
does appear to be drifting away from its blind adherence to
the prophylactic rule. Given these two circumstances, the adoption
of some type of middle ground is quite likely. Such a compromise
position has found success in the federal courts. Their approach
appears to have eliminated the most bankrupt feature of the prophy-
lactic rule-automatic, unthinking reversal-and to have retained
some of the flexibility of the ad hoc approach. While this Comment
completely supports the readoption of the ad hoc rule, it also rec-
ognizes that a compromise rule is the likely trend. In this spirit,
this Comment views the practice of the federal courts as the most ac-
ceptable alternative.
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